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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
REML A. MABUS, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. PRIORITY NO. 14 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, 
Bureau Chief 
Driver License Division, 
Department of Public Safety, 
State of Utah, CASE NO. 981668-CA 
Respondent/ Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has Jurisdiction over appeals from the District Court, Trial De Novo of 
informal adjudicative proceedings before the Department of Public Safety, Driver License 
Division, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996). 
APPELLATE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Is the requirement in Utah Code Annotated § 44-6-44.10(2)(d)( 1997)that the peace 
officer submit a signed report that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been 
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 and that the person had refused 
to submit to a chemical test, a prerequisite to the Department's revoking a person's driver 
license for refusing to submit to the chemical test pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-
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44.10. 
3. Can the Government prevail in the trial de novo of an informal adjudicative 
proceeding when it fails to present evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case? 
Standard of Review 
The review of these issues presents questions of law and are reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 643(Utah App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10(2)(d) (1997) 
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after the date of 
the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been operating or was in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had 
refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-15 (1996) Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings, 
(1) (a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency 
actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile courts have 
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating to: 
(i) the removal or placement of children in state custody; 
(ii) the support of children under Subsection (l)(a)(i) as determined administratively 
under Section 78-3a-906; and 
(iii) substantiated findings of abuse or neglect pursuant to Section 62A-4a-l 16.5. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as 
provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of such a venue provision, in 
the county where the petitioner resides or maintains his principal place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be 
a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall include: 
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(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, together with a 
duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal adjudicative 
proceedings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law 
and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the Trial De Novo of an informal adjudicative proceeding 
before the Driver License Division of the Utah Department of Public Safety. 
Course of Proceedings 
The Department of Public Safety, Driver License Division (the "Department"), 
revoked Appellee's ("Mabus") driving privilege for the period of one year (February 16,1998 
to February 15, 1999), through informal adjudicative action. Mabus sought and was granted 
a full Trial De Novo in the District Court. The Department presented no evidence that the 
peace officer submitted his signed report to the Department as required by Utah Code 
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Annotated § 44-6-44.10(2)(d)(1997). The Honorable Stephen L. Henroid of the Third 
Judicial District Court, ruled that the failure of the Department to establish that the peace 
officer submitted his signed report was fatal to the action against Mabus. The Department 
appealed. 
Relevant Facts 
No evidence was presented at the Trial De Novo, to establish that the peace officer 
submitted a signed report as required by Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(2)(d)(Record 
at 91; Transcript p. 38 1. 16-18). 
Mabus's Petition For Hearing De-Novo and for Extraordinary Writ, in paragraph 12., 
alleges, f,[T]he evidence presented at the hearing before the Driver's License Division was 
insufficient to sustain the Findings and Order of the Department" (Record at 3). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Issues raised by the Department relating to the submitting of a copy of the citation 
to the division are not ripe in that the ruling of the trial court was not based upon a finding 
relative to the submission or non submission of a copy of the citation, but was decided based 
upon the failure of the division to establish that the officer submitted a signed report to the 
Division. 
The Implied Consent Law is a creature of statute. At all times relevant hereto, it has 
required that the peace officer submit a signed report to the Division. This element is one 
among others that must be established in order for the Drivers License Division to revoke a 
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person's driving privilege under the implied consent law. No evidence was presented at the 
"Trial De Novo" before the District Court that a report was submitted at any time. 
To support its position that the submission of the officer's signed report is no longer 
required in revocation proceedings, the Department claims that a requirement for immediate 
notice in the form of the citation, replaced the requirement for submission of the officer's 
report. Even if this were so, no evidence was introduced at trial to show that immediate 
notice via a citation or otherwise, was issued to or served on Mabus. Rather than replacing 
the requirement for the submission of the signed report, the statutory requirement of 
immediate notice is an additional element to be established in revocation proceedings under 
the implied consent law. 
The Division asks this Court for new case law. New case law under the instant facts 
will not give the Division future guidance in interpreting the requirements of the implied 
consent law, because the relevant provision was amended by the 1999 Utah Legislature to 
change the requirement for the filing of the officer's report from a Substantive Requirement 
to a Procedural Requirement. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) requires the District Court to 
review all Informal Adjudicative Proceedings by Trial De Novo of all issues under new 
evidence. The Department claims that under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, "Trial 
De Novo" is limited to only of those specific facts and reasons alleged by a Petitioner in his 
Petition for Judicial Review. The Division claims that Mabus did not raise the issue "that 
he was entitled to relief because the officers missed, or may have missed the 5-day deadline". 
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The timeliness of the submission of the report is not at issue because there was no evidence 
that a report was submitted at any time. In addition, Mabus raised the issue that, "the 
evidence presented at the hearing before the Driver's license Division was insufficient to 
sustain the findings and Order of the Division" (record p. 3). 
Mabus has put into dispute, all elements necessary for a prima facie case including 
the issue relating to the submission of the officer's report. Under the Department's proposed 
new interpretation "Trial De Novo" appeals alleging error on the part of the Department 
would ordinarily be tantamount to a review for correctness or for abuse of discretion. That 
type of review would be is closer to traditional appellate review than to "Trial De Novo". 
This Court held In Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d. 449 (Utah App. 1993) that the 
District Court erred in limiting the inquiry to the issue alleging error raised by Cordova rather 
than by conducting a full trial and remanded the case for "Trial De Novo". This Court held 
that under Utah Administrative Procedures Act that the District Courts are to review informal 
adjudicative proceedings by full trial de novo. This is necesary to make a complete record 
for further appellate review and to cure a myriad of procedural errors at the administrative 
level. Mabus raised issues of violation of due process at the administrative level based in 
part upon the failure of the Department to properly follow notice procedures contained in the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The full trial de novo at the District Court level 
corrected some of these issues. 
The Department failed to marshal the evidence in this matter. It merely realleges its 
obtuse version of largely disputed facts in areas where the record contains conflicting 
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evidence. The Department does not set out any facts that are relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. The District Court made only two findings of fact in this matter: 
1. Petitioner is a resident of Salt Lake County (Record p. 91); and 
2. No evidence was presented that the peace officer submitted a signed 
report as required by Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(2)(d)(Record p. 91, 
Transcript p. 38 lines 16-18). 
The second finding of fact was dispositive. The Department did not even marshal the 
evidence relevant to the decision of the trial court. 
The Department's appeal should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE DEPARTMENT ARE NOT 
RIPE AND WERE NOT THE BASIS OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S RULING. 
The Department raises issues relating to a requirement that the peace officer send a 
copy of the citation to the Division within 5 days (Brief of Appellant, p. 1-2). 
The District Court based its ruling in the instant case upon the failure of the 
Department to present evidence that the peace officer submitted a signed report in 
accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(2)(d). (Record at 91; Transcript p. 38 
1. 14-18). The District Court made no findings relating to the submission or non-submission 
of a citation, therefore, the non- submission of the citation to the division was not the basis 
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for the District Court's Order. The issues presented by the Department relating to the non-
submission of the citation are not ripe.1 
POTNT II 
THE SUBMISSION OF THE OFFICER'S REPORT TO 
THE DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION IS ESSENTIAL TO 
THE REVOCATION OF DRIVING PRIVILEGES UNDER 
THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW. 
The District Court based it's Ruling on the fact that no evidence was presented to 
establish that the peace officer submitted a signed report as required by Utah Code Annotated 
§ 41-6-44.10(2)(d)(Record at 91, Transcript p. 38 1. 16-18). 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(2)(d) provides: 
(d) The peace officer shall submit a report, within five days after the 
date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been 
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 
53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under 41-6-44, or while having any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had 
refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). (emphasis 
added) 
In Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 1988) this Court restated the rule 
that requires the submission of the officer's report to the Driver License Division as a 
lrQiere was however no evidence presented at the trial de novo of this matter that a 
citation was submitted to the division. 
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prerequisite to valid revocation proceedings. The Court stated: 
"It is clear that whether denominated jurisdictional or not, the sworn report fis 
essential to the validity of the subsequent proceedings ... for revocation....11' 
Helsten v. Schwendiman, 668 P.2d 509, 512 (Utah 1983) (quoting Wilcox v. 
Billings, 200 Kan. 654, 659, 438 P.2d 108, 112 (1968)); see Coleman v. 
Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29, 30 (Utah 1984). The Department has the burden 
to produce competent evidence that the revocation proceeding was initiated by 
the sworn report of the arresting officer. Binckley v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 
16 Wash.App. 398, 556 P.2d 561, 563 (1976). Consequently, if the 
Department failed to establish that the sworn report was submitted, appellant's 
license revocation proceeding was invalid and the revocation a legal nullity. 
See, e.g., Wilcox v. Billings, 200 Kan. 654, 438 P.2d 108 (1968): Neely v. 
State, 308 So.2d 880 (La.Ct.App.1975); Dawson v. Austin, 44 Mich.App. 390, 
205 N.W.2d 299 (1973); Blackburn v. Motor Vehicles Div., 33 Or.App. 397, 
576 P.2d 1267 (1978); Coleman v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 (Utah 1984); 
Helsten v. Schwendiman, 668 P.2d 509 (Utah 1983); Binckley v. Dep't of 
Motor Vehicles, 16 Wash.App. 398, 556 P.2d 561 (1976). 
Moore then found, "However, there was no such failure [to file the report] in this case. 
Officer Sullivan testified that he submitted a sworn report to the Department, documenting 
appellant's purported refusal to take the intoxilyzer test". Moore, 750 P.2d at 205. 
The focus then shifted to consider whether the five day statutory time period for 
submitting the peace officer's written report to the Driver License Division was mandatory 
(requiring strict compliance within five days) or directory (allowing substantial compliance 
to suffice). The Court discussed principles of statutory construction to be used in making 
that determination and analyzed both sides of the issue under the law as it existed at the time 
of Moore's arrest. The Court then side-stepped the "thorny issue" of deciding whether the 
five day requirement was mandatory or directive by concluding that the Department had not 
carried its burden in Moore under either construction because, even though evidence 
Page 9 of 22 
established that the requisite report was submitted to the Department, no evidence was 
introduced at trial as to when the report was submitted. Moore, at 207. 
The Department now argues that: 
Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2d. 204 (Utah App. 1998), is no longer good 
law, having been abrogated by new statutory provisions enacted in 1988 and 
still in effect today" (Brief of Appellant p. 4, lines 13-15) 
The Department claims that the Moore Court explained by footnote that the result would 
have been different if Moore was decided after the 1988 amendment took effect. See Brief 
of Appellant p.4, lines 17-21. The Department is mistaken. The purpose of the Moore 
footnote is to let the reader know that the "mandatory11 vs. "directory" issue (relating to the 
five day time period for submitting the report) was analyzed under Section 41-6-44.10 as it 
existed prior to the January 1,1988 revision and that based upon the revisions to that Section, 
"the argument that the five day requirement is mandatory is weaker". Moore, footnote 1. The 
Moore Court held: 
There is no evidence that the report was filed six, seven, eight, or even ten 
days after appellant's arrest. There is no evidence as to when the report was 
filed. Thus, under either a mandatory or a directory standard, the Department's 
position fails. The Department's failure to establish when the required sworn 
report was filed renders the administrative revocation of the appellant's license 
and the derivative district court review void and the revocation a legal nullity 
(citations omitted). Moore, at 207. 
Moore provides further evidence that the submission of the officer's signed report is 
still required after the January 1, 1988 amendments. The Moore Court in its decision dated 
February 17, 1988, said: 
Our decision today should not hinder the State from expeditiously 
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removing drunken drivers from public roads. The sworn report 
documenting a driver's refusal to submit to the intoxilyzer test can be 
admitted at the District Court proceeding for the limited purpose of 
establishing when it was filed or alternatively, the officer can testify as to 
when he or she filed the report with the Department. Either approach 
would have insulated this case from reversal on appeal. Moore, 750 P.2d at 
207. [emphasis added] 
Since the Department (in Moore) did not meet its burden under either standard, the 
holding would have been the same after the 1988 amendments. 
Applying Moore to the instant case requires the Department to establish that the peace 
officer submitted his signed report relating to Mabus's arrest, to the Division on a timely 
basis. Moore does not decide whether a timely submission is strictly within five days or only 
substantially within five days. The Department, however, presented no evidence that the 
peace officer's report concerning Mabus was submitted to the Division at any time. As 
in Moore the Department's position fails under either standard. 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged the continued requirement for the 
submission of the officer's report after the 1987 amendments to the implied consent law that 
took effect January 1,1988. InBurkettv. Schwendiman, 111 P.2d42 (Utah 1989) The driver 
challenged the District Court's finding after trial de novo that the requirement for the filing 
of a sworn report was satisfied, in spite of the fact that the report that was filed with the 
Department was written by one officer and sworn to and signed by an another. The Utah 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot since the license revocation period had passed. 
The Court declined to invoke an exception to the mootness doctrine by saying: 
The issue raised in Burkett's appeal is not likely to recur because the 
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legislature amended the implied consent statute in 1987 to delete the 
requirement of a "sworn statement" and to require only that the officer 
submit "a signed report11 indicating that an arrested driver failed to submit 
to a blood alcohol test. Burkett, 111 P.2d at 44 [emphasis added]. 
It is clear from Burkett that there is still a requirement for the submission of the 
officer's signed report in the instant case. 
POINT III 
THE IMMEDIATE NOTICE REQUIREMENT DID NOT REPLACE 
THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE OFFICER TO SUBMIT HIS SIGNED 
REPORT. 
To support its position that the submission of the officer's signed report is no longer 
required in revocation proceedings, the Department claims that an immediate notice 
requirement replaced the requirement for submission of the officer's report. Footnote 2 on 
page 6 of the Department's Brief reads as follows: 
"[A] peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver License 
Division, immediate notice of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke 
the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle" The 1984 statute 
made the submission of the sworn report the initiation of the proceeding. In 
1988 and now the citation initiates the proceeding. Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-
44.10(2)(e)(i)(Supp. 1998)" 
This argument clearly does not help the Department's position because even if immediate 
notice replaced the requirement for the submission of the signed officer's report, (which it 
did not) no evidence was introduced at trial to show that immediate notice via a citation or 
otherwise, was issued to or served on Mabus. Rather than replacing the requirement for the 
submission of the signed report, the statutory requirement of immediate notice is an 
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additional element to be established in revocation proceedings under the implied consent law. 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(2)(b).2 
POINT TV 
THE CURRENT CASE WILL NOT MAKE GOOD PRECEDENT 
BECAUSE THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW WAS CHANGED 
SUBSTANTIALLY IN 1999, WITH RESPECT TO THE 
REQUIREMENT FOR THE SUBMISSION OF THE OFFICER'S 
REPORT. 
The Division asks this Court for new case law in this matter "Because there have been 
no cases on this issue since Moore in 1989 and the DUI statute has changed" (Appellant's 
Brief page 9). New case law under the instant facts will not give the Division future 
guidance in interpreting the requirements of the implied consent law, because the relevant 
provision was amended by the 1999 Utah Legislature to change the requirement for the filing 
of the Officer's Report from a Substantive Requirement to a Procedural Requirement, and 
2(b) Following the warning under Subsection (a), if the person does not immediately 
request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered a peace 
officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate 
notice of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or 
license to operate a motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf 
of the Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License 
Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the 
Driver License Division, (emphasis added) 
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to allow the Officer ten days for submitting the report rather than five days. 3 
POINT V 
THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT (UAPA) REQUIRES 
THE DISTRICT COURT TO REVIEW ALL INFORMAL ADJUDICATIVE 
PROCEEDINGS BY TRIAL DE NOVO OF ALL ISSUES UNDER NEW 
EVIDENCE. 
Trial De Novo has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as having several 
meanings. It has said: 
The expression "trial de novo" has been used with two different meanings: (1) 
a complete retrial upon new evidence; (2) a trial upon the record made before 
the lower tribunal. Locally we find an example of the first in section 104-77-4, 
R.S.U. 1933 covering appeals from the justice court to the district court — the 
case is tried in the district court as if it originated there. An example of the 
second meaning we find locally in our treatment of equity appeals wherein we 
say that the parties are entitled to a trial de novo upon the record. University 
of Utah v Industrial Commission, 736 P.2d 630, 63% (Utah 1987) (quoting 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad v. Public Service Commission, 100 
P.2d 552 (Utah, 1940)): 
The Supreme Court has also recognized a statutory contortion of the meaning of "Trial 
De Novo", when the legislature has made it's intent clear that the record below be used in the 
3Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44.10(2)(d)(1999) was amended as follows: 
(d) [The] As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed 
report, within [five] ten days after the date of the arrest, that he had grounds 
to believe the arrested person had been operating or was in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under 
Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical test 
or tests under Subsection (1). 1999 Utah Laws, Chapter 226. 
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de novo process. In that situation, the District Court could consider a combination of 
evidence from the record of the proceedings below, together with new evidence, followed by 
fresh and independent Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based upon that combined 
evidence. In University of Utah v. Industrial Commission, 736 P.2d 630 (Utah, 1987) the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized such a legislative intent in claims brought under the former 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, U.C.A., 1953, §§ 34-35-1 to 8 (Supp. 1986). The District 
Court was allowed to consider evidence from the record of the agency and to supplement the 
agency record by additional evidence before making it's independent findings of fact. The 
Court said: "it logically follows from the meaning which we have accorded to a 'trial de novo' 
in this opinion that the district court make its own findings of fact" Id at 63^/. Justice Durham, 
in her concurring opinion, agreed with the Court's interpretation of that specific statutory 
scheme saying, "[W]e have attempted to give some substance to this standard of review. 
However, it cannot be properly referred to as a 'trial de novo'." Id at 63& Justice Durham 
suggested that "An example of a true trial de novo is a retrial of a justice of the peace 
court case in the district court. See U.C.A., 1953, § 78-5-14 (Supp. 1986). On the other 
hand, true appellate review involves a review of the record of proceedings in an inferior 
court by a superior for the correction of error/1 (emphasis added). Id. 
The Department argues for a new, fourth interpretation of "Trial De Novo". The 
Department claims that under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, "Trial De Novo" 
means a limited trial only of those specific facts and reasons alleged by a Petitioner in his 
Petition for Judicial Review. The Division claims that all issues not specifically plead are 
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waived (See Brief of Appellant p. 7-8). The Division claims that because, "Mabus did not 
state in his petition, that he was entitled to relief because the officers missed, or may have 
missed the 5-day deadline" that the issue was "waived and should not have been considered" 
(Brief of Appellant p. 8, lines 5-8). The Department has convoluted the issue before the 
Court. The Finding of the District Court was that "No evidence was presented that the peace 
officer submitted a signed report as required by Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(2)(d)". 
(record p. 91; Transcript p. 38 at lines 14-18). The timeliness of the submission of the report 
is not at issue because there was no evidence that a report was submitted at any time. 
The Petition For Hearing De-Novo and for Extraordinary Writ filed by Mabus raises 
the issue that, "the evidence presented at the hearing before the Driver's license Division was 
insufficient to sustain the findings and Order of the Division" (record p. 3) 
If we assume arguably that a "Trial De Novo" should be strictly limited strictly to the 
hearing of those allegations raised in a driver's Petition, Mabus has put into dispute, all 
elements necessary for a prima facie case including the issue relating to the submission of the 
officer's report. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedures provide in Rule 8(e)(1) that "Each 
averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleadings 
or motions are required". The Department argues for a technical form with respect to the 
Petition. Rule 8 also provides in subparagraph (f) that, "All pleadings shall be construed as 
to do substantial justice". 
A Petitioner will usually seek Trial De Novo based upon claim(s) that the Department 
erred by: making Findings contrary to the evidence, reaching Conclusions contrary to law, or 
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abusing its discretion. Under the Department's proposed new interpretation of "Trial De 
Novo", the Department would limit the evidence taken and argument raised in the District 
Court to that evidence and argument that either proves or disproves a Petitioner's narrowly 
drawn claim of error as set out in his Petition. The Court would consider only the issues of 
whether the Division erred. If evidence and issues were so narrowly limited, "Trial De Novo" 
appeals alleging error on the part of the Department would ordinarily be tantamount to a 
review for correctness or for abuse of discretion. That type of review would be is closer to 
traditional appellate review than to "Trial De Novo". 
In Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d. 449 (Utah App. 1993) The Department took a 
position which opposes its current position. Cordova was given a hearing before the Drivers 
License Division with no witnesses, based solely upon the documents in the Division's file. 
The Hearing Officer made findings that each of the elements were satisfied and ordered the 
suspension of Cordova's driving privileges. Cordova sought review claiming that the order 
should be vacated based upon the failure to follow the "residuum of competent evidence rule". 
Instead of reviewing the decision by trial de novo, the District Court limited the inquiry to the 
claimed error as raised in Cordova's Petition. 
"After concluding that the rule applied, but was not followed, the district court 
granted Cordova's motion to vacate the administrative order and did not 
conduct a full trial", [emphasis added] Cordova, 861 P.2d. at 451. 
The Department appealed the District Court ruling arguing that the court erred in 
limiting the inquiry to the issue raised by Cordova rather than by conducting a full trial. The 
Court of Appeals remanded the case for "Trial De Novo" after concluding that the District 
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Court's review was governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and that: 
Under UAPA, "the district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de 
novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings." 
(citations omitted). . . One reason for this statutory scheme is that appellate 
courts need a complete record in order to review adjudication, (citations 
omitted) Cordova, 861 P.2d. at 451 [emphasis added] 
The review of an informal agency proceeding by a new trial at the district court 
level ensures that an adequate record will be created. Only then can this state's 
appellate courts properly review an informal adjudicative proceeding. In 
addition to the need for an established adequate record, review of an informal 
agency proceeding by trial allows the district court to consider and act on any 
deficiencies that might arise by nature of the informality of the agency hearing. 
Cordova, 861 P.2d. at 452. [emphasis added] 
The Court went on to quote Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 588 (Utah 
App. 1990) saying, "It seems clear that no prejudice would ordinarily occur when an informal 
hearing is held under the UAPA because the litigant has an absolute right to a trial de novo 
before the district court." [emphasis added] Cordova, 861 P.2d. at 452. 
POINT VI 
TRIAL DE NOVO IN THE DISTRICT COURT CURES A MYRIAD OF 
PROCEDURAL ERRORS. 
The "Trial De Novo" process in the District Court is instrumental in curing a myriad 
of procedural errors at the administrative level. In the instant action, Mabus raised issues of 
violation of due process at the administrative level based in part upon the failure of the 
Department to properly follow notice procedures contained in the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (Trial Transcript pp. 3-4). The full trial de novo at the District Court level 
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offered the opportunity for these issues to be cured. (See Brinkerhoffv. Schwendirnan, 790 
P.2d 587 (Utah App. 1990). If "Trial De Novo" at the District Court were to be a limited 
review as proposed by the Department, these procedural irregularities would not be cured. 
In addition, there would not be an adequate record from which the state's appellate courts 
could review these issues. 
PQTNT VII 
COMPLETE TRIAL DE NOVO IS NECESSARY TO PRODUCE AN 
ADEQUATE RECORD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
In order to make an adequate record allowing the State's Appellate Courts to review 
the propriety of the revocation of a driver's driving privilege, the evidence on record from the 
"Trial De Novo" needs to be sufficient to support a finding of each element that would have 
been necessary at the agency level for the agency to revoke the driving privilege. No 
evidence was presented at Mabus' Trial De Novo to support a finding that a peace officer 
submitted a signed report to the Division, and no evidence was presented to support a finding 
that a peace officer served Mabus, on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate notice 
of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke his privilege or license to operate a motor 
vehicle. 
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POTNT VTTT 
EVEN IF ARGUABLY THE PROPER REVIEW WAS SOMETHING LESS 
THAN COMPLETE TRIAL DE NOVO, THERE WAS NO RECORD OF 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW MADE AVAILABLE TO THE DISTRICT COURT FROM 
WHICH A FINDING COULD BE MADE THAT THE OFFICER'S REPORT WAS 
SUBMITTED TO THE DIVISION, 
In the instant case, there was no record of the informal adjudicative proceedings at the 
agency level made available to the District Court at the trial of this matter, from which the 
Court could have made the necessary findings to revoke Mabus's driver license. 
Consequently, the Court could not have made the necessary findings under any of the 
recognized interpretations of "Trial De Novo". 
POINT IX 
THE DEPARTMENT FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
The Appellant has the burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the trial court's 
Findings, not to merely realleges its own version of the facts. ,fThis is not sufficient to 
challenge the trial court's findings or conclusions". State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688,£Q(Utah 
App. 1995). See State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-757 (Utah, 1982). In the instant case, the 
Department realleges its obtuse version of largely disputed facts in areas where the record 
contains conflicting evidence. The Department does not set out any facts that are relevant to 
the issues raised on appeal. Based upon the irrelevance of the facts alleged by the Department 
to the disposition of the case, Mabus is not addressing each of his exceptions to the Statement 
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of Facts as presented by the Department. The Court made only two findings of fact in this 
matter: 
1. Petitioner is a resident of Salt Lake County (Record p. 91); and 
2. No evidence was presented that the peace officer submitted a signed 
report as required by Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(2)(d)(Record p. 91, 
Transcript p. 38 lines 16-18). 
The second finding of fact was dispositive. The Department's appeal should be dismissed for 
failure to marshal the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Implied Consent Law is a creature of statute. At all times relevant hereto, it has 
required that the peace officer submit a signed report to the Division. This element is one 
among others that must be established in order for the Driver License Division to revoke a 
person's driving privilege under the relevant version of the implied consent law. No evidence 
was presented at the "Trial De Novo" before the District Court that a report was submitted at 
any time. Due to the nature of "Trial De Novo", of an informal adjudicative proceeding 
under the Administrative procedures Act, and the need to develop a complete record for 
appeal, the government must establish each element, essential to a prima-facie case. The 
government did not do so in this case and as such the District Court did not err in ruling that 
the revocation cannot stand. Mabus requests that the Trial Court's Order be affirmed and that 
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he be awarded his attorney's fees and costs incurred in responding thereto. 
DATED this [£day of May, 1999. 
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Addendum 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2). 
